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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7574

ROBERT C. LAWRENCE,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from the verdict and judgment of
conviction of grand larceny for theft of an automobile. The
only testimony in the record to support value of the property
stolen was that of the owner of the vehicle, lvfr. Stanley LeRoy
Allen, Jr., to the effect that the automobile was a model 1947
Ford two-door sedan in excellent condition.
At the closing of the case and before instructions to the
jury, counsel for the defendant moved for a directed verdict
on the grounds that there was no evidence as to the value of
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the automobile taken (R. 106). This motion was denied and
in instruction No. 8 the court stated in part:

"*

* * In this case you will take the value of this
property as being in excess of $50.00 and therefore
the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand
larceny (R. 108).
Under the issues raised by defendant on appeal, these are
the only material facts:

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT REASONABLE
MINDS CANNOT DIFFER ON THE QUESTION
WHETHER A MODEL 1947 FORD TWO-DOOR SEDAN
IN EXCELLENT CONDITION EXCEEDS $50.00 IN
VALUE, THERE IS NO ERROR IN INSTRUCTION NO. 8.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT, BY TAKING THIS APPEAL, HAS
WAIVED THE PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY IN THE
EVENT OF REVERSAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
INSTRUCTION .NO. 8 WAS NOT ERROR BECAUSE
REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER ON THE
PROPOSITION THAT A MODEL 1947 FORD TWO-DOOR
4
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I.

I

I.

SEDAN IN EXCELLENT CONDITION EXCEEDS $50.00
IN VALUE.
We concede that, where there is no evidence at all upon
which value of property stolen may be based, a conviction of
grand larcency under Section 103-36-4 ( 1), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, cannot stand. However, the record of this case
shows that the property taken was a model 1947 Ford twodoor sedan in excellent condition. Defendant on this appeal
does not put in issue the question whether he actually stole
this property. He does not attack the conviction on the
grounds that he did not commit an act of larceny. His position
is merely that, because the prosecuting attorney did not place
testimony in the record of the monetary value of the automobile stolen, this court should reverse and remand for dismissal or directions to enter a verdict of guilty of petit larceny.
He apparently concedes that a model 1947 Ford two-door sedan
in excellent condition has some value.
We respectfully submit that as a matter of general knowledge a model 1947 Ford two-door sedan in excellent condition
is worth far in excess of $50.00 and that the minds of reasonable men could not differ on this point. It would be absurd
indeed to urge that the stealing of such a vehicle should be
punished as petit larcency. In view of this, we respectfully
submit that the court did not commit prejudicial error in giving
instruction No. 8.
We have been unable to find authority in point on this
issue. However, cases cited by defendant involve property,
the value of which is highly debatable, or property, the value
of which may be so dose to the minimum amount for grand
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larcency and about which reasonable men :might differ, such
as to warrant reversal, or cases where there is no evidence on
which value may be inferred. We believe the facts of this
case are easily distinguishable from those of authorities cited.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT, BY TAKING THIS APPEAL, HAS
WAIVED THE PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY IN THE
EVENT OF REVERSAL.
Defendant in his argument under Point three constructs
an ingenious proposition to the effect that the defendant has
been once in jeopardy by reason of the trial of this case, that
the alleged error in failing to prove value of the property stolen
justifies reversal, and in view of the fact that he has been
once in jeopardy this court must either reverse and remand
with directions to dismiss or reverse and remand with directions
to enter a judgment of guilty of petit larceny.
We believe thjs is a misapprehension of the law, and defendant, by appealing from the verdict and judgment has
waived' a plea of jeopardy. Defendant does not contend that
the record shows no crime was committed; he does not assert
that he could not be guilty of larceny in one degree or another.
The record amply supports the, finding that he stole the automobile. If the failure of the prosecuting attorney to put in
testimony as to the monetary value of the automobile be
reversible error; then we maintain that defendant is at most
entitled to a new trial.
_In the case of People vs. Travers, 19 Pac. 268, 77 Cal.
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176, defendant had been charged with an attempt to commit
burglary, without specification of the degree. A verdict of
"guilty as charged" was returned, and judgment entered, from
which he appealed. The case was reversed and remanded
for new trial. Defendant then filed a supplementary plea of
once in jeopardy. The California Supreme Court held that
such a plea did not lie, stating in part:
"If, however, the court had no jurisdiction of the
cause, or if the indictment or information was so defective that no valid judgment could be rendered upon
it; or if, by any overruling necessity, the jury are discharged without a verdict, or the ·jury are discharged
with the consent of the defendant, either express or
implied; or if, after verdict against the accused, it has
been set aside on his motion for a new trial, or on
writ of error, or in arrest of judgment,-in all these,
and a few other cases which might be enumerated, the
accused may again be put upon trial, and the proceedings had will constitute no protection. * * * When
the defendant appealed from the judgment, and procured a reversal, one of the effects of which was the
ordering of a new trial, the judgment and verdict in
such a case must be assumed to be set aside at the
instance of the defendant, upon the theory that he who
procures the reversal or affirmance of a judgment
impliedly assents to all the consequences legitimately
following such reversal or affirmance."

The rule is stated thus in 22 Corpus Juris Secundum 275,
p. 411, "Criminal Law":

" * * * An accused person waives his right to plead
former jeopardy by applying for a new trial. When,
therefore, a new trial is granted in the appellate court,
and he is reindicted, or is tried on the original indictment, accused cannot plead, as a bar to the prosecution,
7
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the conviction which was reversed on the appeal, even
though he had not asked for a new trial."
See also People vs. Stratton, 28 P2d. 695, 136 Cal App 201,
and People vs. Eppinger, 41 Pac. 1037, 109 Cal 294.
In view of the fact that there is no question but that
defendant committed larceny of one degree or another, in
event this Court finds error in the trial court's instruction No.
8, then we submit that the case should be remanded for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION
The record amply supports the finding that the defendant
stole the automobile in question. Nowhere in his appeal
does defendant deny this or urge that the record does not
support a finding of larceny. Merely to state that theft of a
model 1947 Ford two-door sedan in excellent condition could
be petit larceny appears ludicrous. We respectfully submit
that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in taking
judicial notice that such an automobile is worth more than
$50.00.
Further, we respectfully submit that, if the trial court
thus committed prejudicial error, then defendant is at most
entitled to a new trial, and if such trial be ordered, he cannot
plead jeopardy.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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